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Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Aurora Garcia-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis et Aldo Montesano
n° 10-192, mars 2010
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.
James K. Hammitt
n° 10-267, mars 2010
André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger et Karine Van Der Straeten
vol. 35, n° 3, mars 2010, p. 435–472
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under...
Christian Gollier
vol. 145, n° 2, mars 2010, p. 812–829
Claude Crampes et Michel Moreaux
Elsevier, vol. 32, n° 2, mars 2010, p. 325–333
vol. 59, n° 2, mars 2010, p. 142–148
Hippolyte D'Albis
n° 750, mars 2010
mars 2010
Stefan Ambec et Hippolyte D'Albis
vol. 59, n° 2, mars 2010, p. 170–183
Jérôme Mathis
