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Bruno Biais, Johan Hombert et Pierre-Olivier Weill
n° 10-242, 7 décembre 2010
We study the reaction of financial markets to aggregate liquidity shocks when traders face cognition limits. While each financial institution recovers from the shock at a random time, the trader representing the institution observes this recovery with a delay, reecting the time it takes to collect...
Marc Ivaldi et Jérôme Pouyet
n° 10-206, 6 décembre 2010
Based on the modern theory of regulation, the analysis aims to characterize the effective economic regulation of the French railway industry. The methodology consists in econometrically testing various scenarios of regulation and determining which of these best fits the data. Using aggregate data...
Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie-Laure Guillerminet et Juan Daniel Oviedo
n° 10-203, novembre 2010
Motivated by recent policy events experienced by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional...
Robert Rowthorn et Paul Seabright
n° 10-207, novembre 2010
This paper explains the multiple adoption of agriculture around ten thousand years ago, in spite of the fact that the first farmers suffered worse health and nutrition than their hunter gatherer predecessors. If output is harder for farmers to defend, adoption may entail increased defense...
Elie Gray et André Grimaud
n° 10-204, novembre 2010
Cet article présente un modèle de croissance schumpetérien, qui généralise la théorie existante : nous utilisons la différenciation circulaire du modèle de Salop [1979] pour prendre en compte le fait que la connaissance se diffuse, avec plus ou moins d’ampleur, entre les secteurs de recherche. Nous...
Cuong Le Van, Thai Bao Luong, Manh-Hung Nguyen et Tu Anh Nguyen
n° 10-208, novembre 2010
Vincent Réquillart
novembre 2010
Marti Mestieri
Yuk-fai Fong et Daniel F. Garrett
vol. 70, n° 2, novembre 2010, p. 494–501
We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not...
Philippe De Donder
n° 757, novembre 2010
