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12 janvier 2012
11 janvier 2012
9 janvier 2012
6 janvier 2012
4 janvier 2012
David Alary, Christian Gollier et Nicolas Treich
2011, révision 9 juillet 2012
In this paper, we show that ambiguity aversion always raises the demand for self-insurance and the insurance coverage, but may de- crease the demand for self-protection. We also characterize the opti- mal insurance design under ambiguity aversion, and exhibit a case in which the straight deductible...
Roberta Dessi
n° 11-253, décembre 2011, révision décembre 2013
Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered: Silicon Valley is probably the best-known example. Clusters differ in the contracts they use, and in how they perform. I explore the link between spillovers, contractual design and performance. I find that more "incomplete"...
Marion Desquilbet et Sylvette Monier-Dilhan
n° 11-263, décembre 2011, révision juin 2012
We analyze the effects of Geographical Indication (GI) labeling on quality choices and welfare with two vertically differentiated goods, one labelable, the other not. We consider two attributes of these goods: gustatory quality and geographical origin. We investigate two extreme cases of the...