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4 janvier 2012
David Alary, Christian Gollier et Nicolas Treich
2011, révision 9 juillet 2012
In this paper, we show that ambiguity aversion always raises the demand for self-insurance and the insurance coverage, but may de- crease the demand for self-protection. We also characterize the opti- mal insurance design under ambiguity aversion, and exhibit a case in which the straight deductible...
Roberta Dessi
n° 11-253, décembre 2011, révision décembre 2013
Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered: Silicon Valley is probably the best-known example. Clusters differ in the contracts they use, and in how they perform. I explore the link between spillovers, contractual design and performance. I find that more "incomplete"...
Marion Desquilbet et Sylvette Monier-Dilhan
n° 11-263, décembre 2011, révision juin 2012
We analyze the effects of Geographical Indication (GI) labeling on quality choices and welfare with two vertically differentiated goods, one labelable, the other not. We consider two attributes of these goods: gustatory quality and geographical origin. We investigate two extreme cases of the...
James K. Hammitt, Jin-Tan Liu et Meng-Wen Tsou
n° 11-273, décembre 2011
This paper examines the causal effect of parental schooling on children’s schooling using a large sample of adoptees from Taiwan. Using birth-parents’ education to help control for selective placement of children with adoptive parents, we find that adoptees raised with more highly educated parents...
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Aurora Garcia-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis et Aldo Montesano
n° 11-274, décembre 2011
We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the...
Philippe De Donder et Pierre Pestieau
n° 11-305, décembre 2011, révision juin 2014
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di§er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels,...
Christoph Rothe et Dominik Wied
2011
Enno Mammen, Christoph Rothe et Melanie Schienle
