Jump to navigation
James K. Hammitt
vol. 21, n° 7, juillet 2012, p. 878–882
Nord (2011) criticizes standard arguments which assert that consistency requires that future health benefits must be discounted at the same rate as future costs in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). He suggests these arguments are misguided because they require transitivity of preferences across...
Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer et Paul Seabright
vol. 50, n° 1, juillet 2012, p. 116–147
Two decades after the end of central planning, we investigate the extent to which the advantages bequeathed by planning in terms of high investment in physical infrastructure and human capital compensated for the costs in allocative inefficiency and weak incentives for innovation. We assemble and...
Pierre Dubois, Alain de Janvry et Elisabeth Sadoulet
vol. 30, n° 3, juillet 2012, p. 555–589
Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton et Eugenio Peluso
vol. 39, n° 2, juillet 2012, p. 457–489
Bruno Biais, Florian Heider et Marie Hoerova
n° 60, juillet 2012, p. 193–222
The paper studies the optimal design of clearing systems. The paper analyzes how counterparty risk should be allocated, whether traders should be fully insured against that risk, and how moral hazard affects the optimal allocation of risk. The main advantage of centralized clearing, as opposed to...
Jean-Pierre Florens, Jan Johannes et Sébastien Van Bellegem
vol. 15, n° 2, juillet 2012, p. 304–324
We consider the semi-parametric regression model Y=Xtβ+φ(Z) where β and φ(·) are unknown slope coefficient vector and function, and where the variables (X, Z) are endogenous. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the parameters in the presence of instrumental...
Arianna Degan et Emmanuel Thibault
n° 12-325, 25 juillet 2012
Why do some dynasties maintain the fortune of their founders while others completely squander it in few generations? To address this question, we use a simple deterministic microfounded model based on two main elements: the “hunger for accumulation” and the “willingness to exert effort”. Contrary...
Jean-Pierre Amigues, Gilles Lafforgue et Michel Moreaux
n° 12-326, 23 juillet 2012, révision 3 avril 2013
Using the Chakravorty et al. (2006) ceiling model, we characterize the optimal consumption paths of three energy resources: dirty oil, which is non-renewable and carbon emitting; clean oil, which is also non-renewable but carbon-free thanks to an abatement technology, and solar energy, which is...
20 juillet 2012
Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas et Vera Zaporozhets
n° 12-324, 18 juillet 2012
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies...
