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Paul Seabright
Princeton University Press, mai 2012
24 mai 2012
23 mai 2012
22 mai 2012
Emmanuelle Auriol
20 mai 2012
Augustin Landier et David Thesmar
16 mai 2012
14 mai 2012
David Martimort et Stéphane Straub
n° 12-315, 11 mai 2012
We analyze how uncertainty regarding future climate conditions affects the design of concession contracts, organizational forms and technological choices in a principal-agent context with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain...
David Bardey et Philippe De Donder
n° 12-320, 11 mai 2012
We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and...
