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Stéphane Couture et Arnaud Reynaud
vol. 72, n° 2, août 2012, p. 203–221
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi
vol. 33, n° 4, août 2012, p. 914–917
Eric Budish et Estelle Cantillon
vol. 102, n° 5, août 2012, p. 2237–2271
This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations...
29 août 2012
Emmanuel Thibault
28 août 2012
Xue-Zhong He et Nicolas Treich
n° 13-394, 20 août 2012
We consider a prediction market in which traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs in probabilities. In the two-state case, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions so that the prediction market is accurate in the sense that the equilibrium state price equals the mean probabilities of traders'...
n° 775, 20 août 2012