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6 juin 2012
5 juin 2012
Emmanuelle Auriol et Alice Mesnard
4 juin 2012
Augustin Landier
1 juin 2012
Michel Le Breton, Peter Sudhölter et Vera Zaporozhets
n° 12-299, mai 2012
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving ?rst...
Michel Le Breton, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Alexei Savvateev et Shlomo Weber
n° 12-300, mai 2012
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Michel Le Breton, Maria Montero et Vera Zaporozhets
n° 12-301, mai 2012
We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to now. Most of the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue in favor of the nucleolus as a...
G. Bordes, G. Laffond et Michel Le Breton
n° 12-302, mai 2012
In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.
Christian Gollier
n° 12-303, mai 2012, révision janvier 2013
We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is...
Anton-Giulio Manganelli
n° 12-309, mai 2012
This paper gives an unified explanation of some of the most widely known facts of the cartel literature: prices gradually rise, then remain constant, there can be price wars and some cartels break down. In this model consumers are loss averse and efficiency of a competitive fringe is not publicly...
