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Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, Hong Guo et Jiong Yang
n° 12-351, juillet 2012, révision novembre 2013
The paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity. The analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the Shanghai Stock Exchange offered more trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package. First, the results show that the...
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret et Julie Subervie
n° 12-357, juillet 2012
Agro-environmental schemes (AES), which pay farmers to adopt greener practices, are increasingly important components of environmental and agricultural policies both in the US and the EU. Here we study the French implementation of the EU AES program. We estimate additional and windfall effects of...
Jean-François Brocard et Michel Cavagnac
n° 13-391, juillet 2012, révision novembre 2016
We study the effects of completing the legal framework of matchmakers with a rule designating which party must pay the commission. The paper examines the two rules currently open to debate at the international level in sport: the "player-pays" principle and the "club-pays" principle. We find that...
Ben Handel, Igal Hendel et Michael Whinston
juillet 2012
This paper studies equilibrium and welfare in a class of regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges. We use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual-level (i) projected health risk and (ii) risk preferences. We combine these micro-foundations with a model of...
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, Nicholas Bloom et William R. Kerr
We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuringendogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using detailed US Census...
James K. Hammitt
vol. 21, n° 7, juillet 2012, p. 878–882
Nord (2011) criticizes standard arguments which assert that consistency requires that future health benefits must be discounted at the same rate as future costs in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). He suggests these arguments are misguided because they require transitivity of preferences across...
Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer et Paul Seabright
vol. 50, n° 1, juillet 2012, p. 116–147
Two decades after the end of central planning, we investigate the extent to which the advantages bequeathed by planning in terms of high investment in physical infrastructure and human capital compensated for the costs in allocative inefficiency and weak incentives for innovation. We assemble and...
Pierre Dubois, Alain de Janvry et Elisabeth Sadoulet
vol. 30, n° 3, juillet 2012, p. 555–589
Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton et Eugenio Peluso
vol. 39, n° 2, juillet 2012, p. 457–489
Bruno Biais, Florian Heider et Marie Hoerova
n° 60, juillet 2012, p. 193–222
The paper studies the optimal design of clearing systems. The paper analyzes how counterparty risk should be allocated, whether traders should be fully insured against that risk, and how moral hazard affects the optimal allocation of risk. The main advantage of centralized clearing, as opposed to...
