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Misato Sato (London School of Economics)
2024
Nicolas Astier (Paris School of Economics)
Mert Demirer (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Félix Michelet (Mines ParisTech)
Geoffrey Barrows (Ecole Polytechnique)
Aude Pommeret (Université Savoie Mont Blanc)
Armon Rezai (Vienna University of Economics and Business)
Simon Lang (Yale University)
Andrew Yates (University of North Carolina)
David Martimort, Pierre Fleckinger et Nicolas Roux
vol. 62, n° 4, décembre 2024, p. 1589–1646
What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research suggests that, depending on the organizational context, the optimal approach to providing incentives may...