Recherche avancée

Emmanuelle Auriol et Robert J. Gary-Bobo

vol. 153, décembre 2012, p. 419–445

We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good...

Jean-Paul Azam

vol. 153, n° 3-4, décembre 2012, p. 357–373

This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of...

Emmanuel Farhi et Jean Tirole

vol. 79, n° 2, 2012, p. 678–706

This paper analyzes the possibility and the consequences of rational bubbles in a dynamic economy where financially constrained firms demand and supply liquidity. Bubbles are more likely to emerge, the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity and the more limited the pledgeability of corporate...

Marie-Françoise Calmette et Maureen Kilkenny

vol. 49, n° 2, 2012, p. 373–396

This paper formalizes and demonstrates how transport infrastructure between rural areas helps Third World countries deal with crop failures. In developed economies where transport costs are negligible, a crop failure in one area enhances market opportunities for producers in other growing regions....

Olivier Faugeras

vol. 41, n° 1, 2012, p. 16–33

To make a prediction of a response variable from an explanatory one which takes into account features such as multimodality, a nonparametric approach based on an estimate of the conditional density is advocated and considered. In particular, we build point and interval predictors based on the...

Patrick Rey et Zhijun Chen

vol. 102, n° 7, 2012, p. 3462–3482

We show that large retailers, competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower range, can exercise market power by pricing below cost some of the products also offered by the smaller rivals, in order to discriminate multi-stop shoppers from onestop shoppers. Loss leading thus appears as an...

Georges Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer et Pierre Pestieau

vol. 115, n° 1, 2012, p. 423–426

We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.

Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau

vol. 114, n° 4, décembre 2012, p. 1437–1459

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteris- tics such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second...

Michel Le Breton, Maria Montero et Vera Zaporozhets

vol. 63, 2012, p. 159–173

We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to now. Most of the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue in favor of the nucleolus as a...

Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur et Pierre Pestieau

vol. 25, n° 2, 2012, p. 763–778

We study the optimal income taxation of couples. We determine the resulting intra-family labor supply allocation and its implication for the choice of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We provide a general condition for full joint taxation to arise. We also study how the spouses’...