Jump to navigation
Helmuth Cremer et Dario Maldonado
n° 13-381, février 2013
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on "peer group"effects. In the first stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they fix their tuition fees. We examine how the...
Samuele Centorrino et Laura Concina
n° 13-383, février 2013
We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions. Moreover, evidence...
Andrea M. Leiter et Christoph Rheinberger
n° 13-382, février 2013
We develop a theoretical account of how athletes engaged in risky sports value riskreducing information and use stated-preference data from a sample of backcountry skiers to empirically challenge the predictions of our model. Risk taking in this specific context depends on the athlete’s personal...
Jean-François Bonnefon, Wim De Neys et Astrid Hopfensitz
n° 13-385, février 2013
Testosterone administration appears to make individuals less trusting, and this effect was interpreted as an adaptive adjustment of social suspicion, that improved the accuracy of trusting decisions. Here we consider another possibility, namely that testosterone increases the subjective cost of...
Augustin Landier, David Sraer et David Thesmar
n° 13-438, février 2013
We show empirically that banks' exposure to interest rate risk, or income gap, plays a crucial role in monetary policy transmission. In a first step, we show that banks typically retain a large exposure to interest rates that can be predicted with income gap. Secondly, we show that income gap also...
n° 800, février 2013
Michel Le Breton et Karine Van Der Straeten
vol. 64, février 2013, p. 173–240
vol. 142, n° 1, février 2013, p. 143–150
The capacity to trust wisely is a critical facilitator of success and prosperity, and it has been conjectured that people of higher intelligence are better able to detect signs of untrustworthiness from potential partners. In contrast, this article reports five trust game studies suggesting that...
Jean-François Bonnefon, Vittorio Girotto, Marco Heimann et Paolo Legrenzi
vol. 36, n° 1, février 2013
