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Jean-Pierre Amigues, Alain Ayong Le Kama, Ujjayant Chakravorty et Michel Moreaux
vol. 64, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 241–264
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Aurora Garcia-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis et Aldo Montesano
vol. 120, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 216–227
We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the...
Paul Seabright
sous la direction de Brett Calcott, Ben Fraser, Richard Joyce et Kim Sterelny, MitCognet, chapitre 5, mars 2013
Antonio Acconcia, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo et Patrick Rey
n° 13-403, 30 mars 2013
We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by...
29 mars 2013
Jacques Delpla
28 mars 2013
25 mars 2013
22 mars 2013
Augustin Landier et David Thesmar
21 mars 2013
Klenio Barbosa (Sao Paulo School of Eonomics - FGV)
Manufacture, Toulouse, France, 14–15 mars 2013
