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Adam Storeygard (Tufts University)
Manufacture, Toulouse, France, 14–15 mars 2013
Lika Ba (EHESS)
Julia Bird (Toulouse School of Economics)
Alex Moore (LSE & The World Bank)
Jean-Jacques Dethier (World Bank)
Catherine Bobtcheff, Jérôme Bolte et Thomas Mariotti
n° 13-377, février 2013, révision septembre 2015
We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting preemption...
Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Paul Dudley et Frank Rodriguez
n° 13-378, février 2013
Pascal Lavergne
n° 13-379, février 2013
In empirical research, one commonly aims to obtain evidence in favor of re- strictions on parameters, appearing as an economic hypothesis, a consequence of economic theory, or an econometric modeling assumption. I propose a new theoret- ical framework based on the Kullback-Leibler information to...
Helmuth Cremer et Dario Maldonado
n° 13-381, février 2013
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on "peer group"effects. In the first stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they fix their tuition fees. We examine how the...
Samuele Centorrino et Laura Concina
n° 13-383, février 2013
We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions. Moreover, evidence...
