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Luis Garicano et Claudia Steinwender
mars 2013
We expect firms that face financial constraints to prioritize shorter term investments over longer term ones. Using a high quality panel data set, and a difference-in-differences approach to control for demand effects, we study whether this has been indeed the case after the sharp deterioration of...
Sergi Basco et Marti Mestieri
vol. 89, n° 2, mars 2013
M Grasmair, O Scherzer et Anne Vanhems
vol. 29, n° 3, mars 2013
This paper considers the nonparametric regression model with an additive error that is dependent on the explanatory variables. As is common in empirical studies in epidemiology and economics, it also supposes that valid instrumental variables are observed. A classical example in microeconomics...
Marc Ivaldi
Frédéric Gonzales, Patrice Guillotreau, Laurent Le Grel et Michel Simioni
Ottawa, vol. 61, n° 1, mars 2013, p. 37–60
Arnaud Reynaud et Alban Thomas
vol. 24, mars 2013, p. 48–58
Katrin Erdlenbruch, Alain Jean-Marie, Michel Moreaux et Mabel Tidball
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 52, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 429–459
Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan et Nicolas Vieille
vol. 148, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 502–534
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...
Jean-Pierre Amigues, Alain Ayong Le Kama, Ujjayant Chakravorty et Michel Moreaux
vol. 64, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 241–264
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Aurora Garcia-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis et Aldo Montesano
vol. 120, n° 2, mars 2013, p. 216–227
We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the...
