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Patrick Rey et Jean Tirole
n° 13-439, 23 octobre 2013, révision janvier 2018
The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between...
Charles Angelucci et Simone Meraglia
n° 13-443, 23 octobre 2013
We build a model to investigate the interaction between trade, the supply of law and order, and the nature of governing political institutions. To supply law and order necessary for a representative merchant to create wealth, a ruler (i) appoints officials capable of coercion and (ii) introduces a...
Alexander Guembel
18 octobre 2013
Stephen F. Hamilton, Philippe Bontems et Jason Lepore
n° 13-466, 15 octobre 2013
Policy design in oligopolistic settings depends critically on the mode of competition between firms. We develop a model of oligopoly intermediation that reveals the mode of competition to be an equilibrium outcome that depends on the relative degree of rivalry between firms in the upstream and...
Augustin Landier
14 octobre 2013
Paul Seabright
3 octobre 2013
Jean-Philippe Lesne
Andrei Hagiu et Bruno Jullien
n° 13-431, septembre 2013
Platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We show that the entry of a platform competitor leads to higher (lower) equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a...
Augustin Landier et Guillaume Plantin
n° 13-514, septembre 2013
Afluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This paper studies an economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-...
