Jump to navigation
1 juin 2013
Bruno Jullien, Jérôme Pouyet et Wilfried Sand-Zantman
n° 13-415, mai 2013, révision décembre 2016
We analyze early contracting when a seller has private information on the future gains from trade and the buyer can bypass. Despite ex-post trade occurring under complete information and being efficient, early negotiation with an informed seller allows the uninformed buyer to improve her bargaining...
Helmuth Cremer et Firouz Gahvari
n° 13-408, mai 2013
Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton et Dimitrios Xefteris
n° 13-405, mai 2013
The main purpose of this short paper is to examine how traditional Downsian dynamics (convergence of the parties to the median of the distribution) are altered by the introduction of centrifugal incentives arising from the fact that any motion towards the center induces a lost of votes at the...
Jean-Paul Azam
n° 13-406, mai 2013
This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, where the local government triggers an insurgency with a view to acquire the control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict that...
Diego Comin et Marti Mestieri
n° 13-409, mai 2013
If Technology Has Arrived Everywhere, Why Has Income Diverged? We study the lags with which new technologies are adopted across countries, and their long-run penetration rates once they are adopted. Using data from the last two centuries, we document two new facts: there has been convergence in...
Abdelaati Daouia, Stéphane Girard et Armelle Guillou
n° 13-411, mai 2013
The estimation of optimal support boundaries under the monotonicity constraint is relatively unexplored and still in full development. This article examines a new extreme-value based model which provides a valid alternative for completely envelopment frontier models that often super from lack of...
Roberta Dessi et Josepa Miquel-Florensa
n° 13-413, mai 2013
We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agent's status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for performance (an IQ...
Suzanne Scotchmer
n° 13-421, mai 2013
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to exploit patents on their federally sponsored re- search. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from sponsors and income from licensing. Tax credits for private R&D also contribute, because they increase the...
Bruno Biais et Augustin Landier
n° 13-423, mai 2013, révision juillet 2018
While potentially more productive, more complex tasks request more e¤ort, generating larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old...
