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Milo Bianchi et Matteo Bobba
vol. 80, n° 2, 2013, p. 491–511
Milo Bianchi
vol. 15, n° 1, 2013, p. 1–23
Christine Grün
vol. 51, n° 5, 2013, p. 4039–4065
In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given the possibility to guess the missing information. We show...
Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Augustin Landier et Rabih Moussawi
vol. 68, n° 6, décembre 2013, p. 2383–2434
We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return...
Emmanuel Farhi, Josh Lerner et Jean Tirole
vol. 44, n° 4, Winter 2013, p. 610–631
Wilfried Sand-Zantman
vol. 91, n° 3, 2013
Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder
vol. 108, 2013, p. 33–43
This paper examines whether myopia (misperception of the long-term care (LTC) risk) and private insurance market loading costs can justify social LTC insurance and/or the subsidization of private insurance. We use a two-period model wherein individuals differ in three unobservable characteristics:...
Helmuth Cremer, Pierre Pestieau et Grégory Ponthieres
vol. 2, 2013, p. 107–148
James K. Hammitt
vol. 47, n° 3, décembre 2013, p. 311–325
Marion Desquilbet, Bruno Dorin et Denis Couvet
vol. 32, 2013, p. 377–389