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Hunt Allcott, Allan Collard-Wexler et Stephen D. O'Connell
Toulouse, France, 5–6 juin 2014
Martino Pelli, Ujjayant Chakravorty et Beyza Ural Marchand
Catherine Wolfram, Eric Brewer, Carson Christiano, Ken Lee, Francis Meyo, Edward Miguel, Matt Podolsky et Javier Rosa
James Bushnell (UC Davis and NBER) et David Newbery (University of Cambridge)
Richard Green et Thomas-Olivier Léautier
Paul Scott
n° 14-526, mai 2014
I develop a new framework for analyzing land use change with dynamically optimizing landowners. My empirical approach allows for unobservable heterogeneity and avoids the burden of explicitly modeling the evolution of market-level state variables like input and output prices. Using a rich new data...
Adrien Blanchet, Pascal Mossay et Filippo Santambrogio
n° 14-489, mai 2014
We extend Beckmann’s spatial model of social interactions to the case of a two-dimensional spatial economy involving a large class of utility functions, accessing costs, and space-dependent amenities. We show that spatial equilibria derive from a potential functional. By proving the existence of a...
Adrien Blanchet et Guillaume Carlier
n° 14-490, mai 2014
The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the framework of N player games. Analysis of Nash equilibria is however a complex issue when the number of players is large. In this article we emphasize the role of optimal transport theory in: 1) the...
n° 14-491, mai 2014
This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordi- nary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations...
Helmuth Cremer et Pierre Pestieau
n° 14-492, mai 2014
One of the pervasive problems with means-tested public long term care (LTC) programs is their inability to prevent individuals who could afford private long term services from taking advantage of public care. They often manage to elude the means-test net through "strategic impoverishment". We show...
