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Renato Gomes et Kane Sweeney
vol. 86, juillet 2014, p. 421–437
We develop a Bayes–Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Our main result characterizes the efficient Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the GSP and provides a necessary and sufficient condition that...
Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, Hong Guo et Jiong Yang
vol. 44, juillet 2014, p. 189–206
The paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity. The analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the Shanghai Stock Exchange offered more trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package. First, the results show that the...
Fabien Gensbittel, Miquel Oliu-Barton et Xavier Venel
vol. 1, n° 3, juillet 2014, p. 411–445
Jérôme Renault
vol. 1, n° 3, juillet 2014, p. 471–484
Marc Ivaldi
30 juillet 2014
Jacques Delpla
Takuro Yamashita
n° 14-513, 20 juillet 2014
We study the mechanism-design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. We then prove the bound to be...
Philippe De Donder et Eugenio Peluso
n° 14-509, 18 juillet 2014
We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that...
18 juillet 2014
