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Jess Benhabib (New York University)
Toulouse : TSE, 8 juin 2009, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and inter-generational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are incomplete, exposing agents to both labor income and capital income risk. We show that the stationary wealth...
Mark Van Achter (University of Bonn and H.U. Brussel)
TSE, 8 juin 2009, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
This paper considers a trading game in which sequentially arriving liquidity traders either opt for a market order or for a limit order. One class of traders is considered to have an extended trading horizon, implying their impatience is linked to their trading orientation. More specifically,...
Maria A. García-Valiñas (University of Oviedo)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 juin 2009, 14h00–15h30, salle MC 204
EU Water Framework Directive leads to manage water in an efficient way. Water scarcity originates frequently the need for rationing, and various methods, including supply interruptions, can be used. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of those methods in reducing...
Toulouse, France, 5–6 juin 2009
Manufacture des Tabacs, Toulouse, France : Université Toulouse I, 5–6 juin 2009
Pierre Boyer (TSE/GREMAQ AND EHESS)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2009, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
This paper studies public good provision and the equity-efficiency trade-off in a three-tier hierarchy. A Prime Minister, an inequality-averse utilitarian planner, is at the top, the citizens at the bottom and a Spending Ministry in between. The citizens are privately informed about their public...
Vera Zaporozhets (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economic)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MC 203
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model...
Glen Weyl (Harvard Society of Fellows)
Toulouse : TSE, 2 juin 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Pass-through rates play an analogous role in imperfectly competitive markets to elasticities under perfect competition. Log-curvature of demand links the pass-through of cost and production shocks to the division between consumer and producer surplus. Therefore in a wide range of single-product,...
Christian Bontemps (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, mai 2009
Thibault Larger (TSE - GREMAQ - ENAC)
Toulouse : TSE, 28 mai 2009, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
The paper's main contribution is to argue that for a certain class of cost functions, Minimal Differentiation can occur when firms vertically differentiate on one dimension. In a sequential game where two firms compete in prices, I show that either maximal or minimal differentiation occur...
