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Vera Zaporozhets (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economic)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MC 203
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model...
Glen Weyl (Harvard Society of Fellows)
Toulouse : TSE, 2 juin 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Pass-through rates play an analogous role in imperfectly competitive markets to elasticities under perfect competition. Log-curvature of demand links the pass-through of cost and production shocks to the division between consumer and producer surplus. Therefore in a wide range of single-product,...
Christian Bontemps (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, mai 2009
Thibault Larger (TSE - GREMAQ - ENAC)
Toulouse : TSE, 28 mai 2009, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
The paper's main contribution is to argue that for a certain class of cost functions, Minimal Differentiation can occur when firms vertically differentiate on one dimension. In a sequential game where two firms compete in prices, I show that either maximal or minimal differentiation occur...
Nancy Qian (Brown University)
Toulouse : TSE, 28 mai 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper investigates the extent to which the government can strategically distort a free media market by examining the e¤ect of the U.S. State Department's bias in human rights reporting on coverage in the New York Times. To establish causality, we exploit a novel source of variation in the...
28–29 mai 2009
Agustín Pérez-Barahona (Paris 1 & Ecole Polytechnique)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 mai 2009, 11h00–12h00, salle MC 407
We present an OLG model in which life expectancy and environmental quality dynamics are jointly determined. Agents may invest in environmental quality, depending on how much they expect to live. In turn, environmental conditions affects life expectancy. The model produces multiple steady-states (...
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 mai 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Case Law regime over the Statute Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the...
Bernado Guimaraes (London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 25 mai 2009, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
This paper analyses a small open economy that wants to borrow from abroad, cannot commit to repay debt but faces costs if it decides to default. I study the optimal debt contract in this world in order to quantify the impact of shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt. Debt relief generated...
Johan Hombert (ENSAE-CREST)
TSE, 25 mai 2009, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
I study the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions. In the model, entrepreneurs raise funds to set up a firm, then they exert effort, and finally they trade assets. Private financial contracts do not internalize their impact on asset prices. On the one...
