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Geert Ridder (University of Southern California)
Toulouse : TSE, 8 décembre 2009, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
We consider statistical inference on a single component of a parameter vector that satisfies a finite number of moment inequalities. The null hypothesis for this single component is given a dual characterization as a composite hypothesis regarding point identified parameters. We also are careful in...
Peter Robinson (LSE)
Toulouse : TSE, 8 décembre 2009, 15h30–16h30, salle MF 323
Nonparametric regression with spatial, or spatio-temporal, data is considered. The conditional mean of a dependent variable, given explanatory ones, is a nonparametric function, while the conditional covariance reflects spatial correlation. Conditional heteroscedasticity is also allowed, as well as...
Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California)
Toulouse : TSE, 8 décembre 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
We propose a new model of firm reputation that interprets reputation directly as the market belief about product quality. Quality is persistent and is determined endogenously by the firm's past investments. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the firm's reputation and derive implications...
Mirko Wiederholt (Northwestern University)
Toulouse : TSE, 7 décembre 2009, 15h00–16h30, salle MH 205
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rational inattention. Households and decision-makers in firms have limited attention and decide how to allocate their attention. We study the implications of rational inattention for business cycle dynamics. We find that the...
Timo Goeschl (University of Heidelberg)
Toulouse : TSE, 7 décembre 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MH 205
Are prices or quantities the best regulatory instrument to align private actions with public interests in the presence of externalities? We add another dimension to this ongoing debate by experimentally analyzing the interaction between instrument choice and intrinsic motivation of regulated agents...
7–8 décembre 2009
Sebastian Koehne (University of Mannheim)
Toulouse : TSE, 3 décembre 2009, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
Moral hazard models with hidden saving decisions are useful to study such diverse problems as unemployment insurance, income taxation, executive compensation, or human capital policies. How can we solve such models? In general, this is very difficult. Under the conditions derived in this paper,...
Michael Grimm (Institute of Social Studies - The Hague)
Toulouse : TSE, 3 décembre 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
There is a well-known debate about the role of institutions in explaining the long-term development of countries. We believe there is value-added to consider the institutions hypothesis at the micro level within a country to analyze the exact transmission channels linking endogenous institutional...
Martijn Han (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE), University of Amsterdam)
Toulouse : TSE, 2 décembre 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper argues that commonly observed fixed-term renewable employment contracts may increase cartel stability. When managerial appointments are renewed if and only if the firm performs well, cartel stability depends not only on (i) the conventional tradeoff between the immediate monetary gain of...
Levent Kockesen (Koç University)
Toulouse : TSE, 1 décembre 2009, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games with...
