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Kyung Hwan Baik et Jihyun Kim
vol. 170, n° 3, septembre 2014, p. 387–405
We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the delegates choose their effort levels. We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservable-contracts...
1 octobre 2014
Bertille Antoine et Pascal Lavergne
vol. 182, n° 3, septembre 2014, p. 59–69
We consider conditional moment models under semi-strong identification. Identification strength is directly defined through the conditional moments that flatten as the sample size increases. Our new minimum distance estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal, robust to semi-strong...
Andrew Rhodes
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 57, n° 1, septembre 2014, p. 161–194
Consumers often incur costs when switching from one product to another. Recently, there has been renewed debate within the literature about whether these switching costs lead to higher prices. We build a theoretical model of dynamic competition and solve it analytically for a wide range of...
Nguyen Phuong Anh et Michel Simioni
vol. 12, n° 2, septembre 2014, p. 1–24
Nonparametric estimation methods are experiencing a growing success in their application in economics. This success comes from the fact that they do not imply any assumption about the object to estimate: probability density function, regression model… and let the data determine an appropriate model...
Daniel F. Garrett
vol. 87, septembre 2014
We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme—a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract—minimizes the maximum...
Alain Bensoussan, Jens Frehse et Christine Grün
vol. 13, septembre 2014, p. 1719–1736
We consider a non zero sum stochastic differential game with a maximum n players, where the players control a diffusion in order to minimise a certain cost functional. During the game it is possible that present players may die or new players may appear. The death, respectively the birth time of a...
Adrien Blanchet et Guillaume Carlier
vol. 8, n° 4, septembre 2014, p. 417–433
This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordinary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot–Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and repulsive effects. We mainly address separable situations but...
Hippolyte D'Albis, Jacques Loesse Esso et Hector Pifarre
vol. 9, n° 9, septembre 2014
The epidemiological transition has provided the theoretical background for the expectation of convergence in mortality patterns. We formally test and reject the convergence hypothesis for a sample of industrialized countries in the period from 1960 to 2008. After a period of convergence in the...
Claude Crampes et Thomas-Olivier Léautier
30 septembre 2014
