Recherche avancée

Roger Myerson et Jörgen W. Weibull

vol. 83, n° 3, mai 2015, p. 943–976

Heidi Colleran, Grazyna Jasienska, Ilona Nenko, Andrzej Galbarczyk et Ruth Mace

vol. 282, n° 1806, mai 2015

Robert Evans et Soenje Reiche

vol. 157, mai 2015, p. 1159–1187

We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract...

Hugh Gravelle et Fred Schroyen (Norvegian School of Economics)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Jan Boone (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Justina Klimaviciute (Toulouse School of Economics, France and University of Liège, Belgium)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Jan Boone et Christoph Schottmüller (University of Copenhagen)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Nadia Burani et Francesca Barigozzi (University of Bologna)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Sanxi Li et Yaping Wu (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015

Ma Ching-to-Albert et Liisa Laine (University of Jyväskylä)

Toulouse, France, 28–29 mai 2015