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Tristan Tomala (HEC Paris)
Toulouse : TSE, 30 novembre 2010, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Michèle Tertilt (Stanford University)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 novembre 2010, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
An equilibrium search model of the Malawian HIV/AIDS epidemic is presented. Individuals engage in different types of sexual activity, which vary in their riskiness. When choosing a sexual activity, such as short-term sex without a condom, a person rationally considers its risk. A simulated version...
Frédéric Cherbonnier (TSE)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 novembre 2010, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
We examine the provision of insurance against non observable liquidity shocks for a time-inconsistent agent who can privately store resources. When lack of self control is strong enough, hidden storage does not constrain the allocation of resources. The optimal contract is strictly concave and...
Stéphane Turolla (INRA de Rennes)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 novembre 2010, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Carlos Canon (TSE-GREMAQ)
Toulouse : TSE, 25 novembre 2010, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
A platform offers an environment where heterogenous buyers and sellers have one opportunity to meet a partner and form a match; no match is feasible outside the environment. We evaluate and compare the profit maximizing and the surplus maximizing platforms. There are two important features:...
Fabien Gensbittel (Universités Paris 1 et Paris 6)
Toulouse : TSE, 25 novembre 2010, 12h30–14h00, salle MB 405
We study the asymptotic behavior of a general class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side. A typical example is a financial exchange game where an informed agent is facing a sequence of uninformed risk-neutral agents. The principal assumption we need is that the...
Pascal Lavergne (TSE-GREMAQ)
Toulouse : TSE, 23 novembre 2010, 15h30–17h00, salle MF 323
Empirical researchers commonly want to assess the validity of restrictions on parameters, appearing as an economic hypothesis, a consequence of economic theory, or an econometric modeling assumption. I propose a new theoretical framework to assess the approximate validity of multivariate...
Balazs Szentes (LSE Londres)
Toulouse : TSE, 23 novembre 2010, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper considers a dynamic economy where agents repeatedly matched with one another and can decide whether to form a profitable partnership. Each agent has a physical and a social color. The social color of an agent is a signal about the physical color of agents in his partenrship history....
Elias Albagli (University of Southern California)
Toulouse : TSE, 22 novembre 2010, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
This paper argues that the capacity of financial markets to aggregate information is diminished in times of distress, resulting in countercyclical economic uncertainty. I build upon a rational expectations equilibrium model that delivers this result from the combination of (i) countercyclical...
Cees Withagen (Tilburg University- CentER)
Toulouse : TSE, 22 novembre 2010, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
The Green Paradox states that, in the absence of an appropriate tax on CO2 emissions, subsidizing a renewable backstop such as solar or wind energy brings forward the date at which fossil fuels become exhausted and consequently global warming is aggravated. We shed light on this issue by solving a...
