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Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi et Nicolas Vieille
vol. 85, 2014, p. 70–83
This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994),...
Saura Masconale, Simone M. Sepe et Brent White
vol. 64, n° 1, 2014
Pierre André et Jean-Luc Demonsant
vol. 12, n° 2, 2014, p. 61–65
Sergio Chávez, Jean-Luc Demonsant et Jacqueline Hagan
vol. 2, n° 2, 2014, p. 76–100
Most human capital and migration studies classify migrants with limited formal education as “unskilled,” despite substantial skills developed through job and life experiences. Drawing on a binational multi-stage research project that involved interviews with 320 Mexican migrants and return migrants...
Jean-Luc Demonsant
vol. 7, 2014, p. 78–98
Matthieu Bouvard
vol. 27, n° 1, 2014, p. 180–210
This study examines the financing of innovation in the presence of adverse selection in the capital market. An entrepreneur with private information needs outside funding for a project requiring costly experimentation. Equilibrium contracts use the duration of the experimentation period, together...
Jorge Peña, Laurent Lehmann et Georg Nöldeke
vol. 346, 2014, p. 23–33
Augustin Landier et David Thesmar
sous la direction de Markus K. Brunnermeier et Arvind Krishnamurthy, Chicago University Press, chapitre 2, 2014, p. 31–44
Claire Borsenberger, Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Denis Joram et Sébastien Lecou
sous la direction de Timothy J. Brennan et Michael A. Crew, Edward Edgar Publishing, chapitre 6, 2014, p. 75–92
Catarina Goulão et Julian Perelman
sous la direction de A. Culyer, vol. 2, 2014, p. 77–82