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Volodymyr Lugovskyy (Indiana University)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 juin 2024, 11h00–12h15, salle Auditorium 4
We evaluate the expected impact of the International Maritime Organization’s 2023 regulatory regime that will cap CO2 emissions from global maritime shipping. Focusing on U.S. imports— for which we compile granular vessel, route, emission, and trade data— we structurally estimate a model featuring...
Daniella Puzzello (Indiana University)
Toulouse : TSE, 7 juin 2024, 14h00–15h15, salle Auditorium 4
Monetary exchange is called essential when better outcomes become incentive compatible when money is introduced. We study essentiality theoretically and experimentally using nite-horizon monetary models that are naturally suited to the lab. Following mechanism design, we also study the effects of...
6 juin 2024, 09h00–15h00, salle Auditorium 5
Stefan Ambec et Mathias Reynaert
6–7 juin 2024, salle Auditoriums A3-A4
Bergen, 5 juin 2024
Harvey Whitehouse
Toulouse : IAST, 5 juin 2024, Auditorium 3 Jean-Jacques Laffont
Daniele Condorelli (University of Warwick)
4 juin 2024, 14h00–15h00, Zoom Meeting
A platform matches a unit-mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit-mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching, sellers make take-it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and...
Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2024, 11h00–12h30, salle Auditorium 5
This paper combines dynamic mechanism design with collective experimentation. Agents are heterogeneous in that some stand to benefit from a proposed policy reform, while others are better off under the status quo policy. Each agent's private information regarding her reference type accrues only...
Banque de France, Paris, 4 juin 2024
Simon Anderson (University of Virginia)
TSE, 3 juin 2024, 14h15–15h30, salle Auditorium 4
We model a software application platform selling devices to consumers and collecting percentage commission over in-app purchases. Apps are complements, differ in their quality and consumers differ in their unit benefit from app quality. App developers decide whether to develop an app (incurring a...
