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James K. Hammitt (Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA-INRA))
Toulouse : TSE, 3 octobre 2011, 11h00–12h30, salle Amphi S
We estimate willingness to pay for small reductions in the risk of suffering a range of morbid health conditions using a stated-preference survey fielded to an internet panel that is representative of the US population. The adverse health conditions are described using a generic health utility...
Lucas Maestri (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 30 septembre 2011, 13h45–15h00, salle MS 003
We study a repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. We make minimal assumptions on the joint distribution of the principal's output and the agent's private signal. We show that there exists a class of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which approaches efficiency as the discount...
Anna Dreber (Stockholm School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 septembre 2011, 15h30–17h00, salle MF 323
Competitiveness is typically measured by the performance change when going from a piece-rate scheme to a tournament or by the choice of performing in a tournament or in a piece-rate scheme. Men are often found to be more competitive than women with both measures. In this talk I will discuss to what...
Augustin Landier et Guillaume Plantin
Toulouse, France, 29 septembre 2011
Larbi Alaoui (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Toulouse : TSE, 27 septembre 2011, 11h00–12h30, salle Amphi S
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals often prefer to avoid observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot accommodate these cases, since it...
Nicholas Trachter (EIEF - Rome)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 septembre 2011, 17h00–18h30, salle Amphi S
We characterize the optimal anticipated monetary policy in economies where agents have precautionary savings motives due to random production opportunities and the presence of borrowing constraints. Non storable production makes intrinsically useless outside money valuable to insure consumption. We...
Igor Muraviev (International College of Economics & Finance, Moscow)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 septembre 2011, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
The paper analyzes the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a situation where competition exists both upstream and downstream, and both sides have balanced and differentiated bargaining power. It devel- ops the framework of sequential bilateral negotiations between two rival manufacturers...
Toulouse, France : Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, 26–27 septembre 2011
Guillaume Vigeral (Université Paris Dauphine)
Toulouse : TSE, 23 septembre 2011, 13h45–15h00, salle MS 003
We consider some two-player zero-sum stochastic games played on the circle. At each stage the state of the game rotates by an angle depending on the actions played by both players. For some fixed length of the game n, the goal of the first player is to maximize the Cesaro mean of the payoffs...
Biritta Augsburg (IFS)
Toulouse : TSE, 22 septembre 2011, 11h00–12h30, salle MF323
We use a randomized controlled trial to analyze the impact of microcredit on poverty reduction among Bosnian households without prior access to finance. The participants consist of 1,200 individuals that EKI, a Bosnian microfinance institution, would normally have just rejected on the basis of its...
