Recherche avancée

Bruno Biais, Jean-Charles Rochet et Paul Woolley

vol. 28, n° 5, 2015, p. 1353–1380

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention export to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, confidence improves. This...

Guillaume Plantin

vol. 28, n° 1, 2015, p. 146–175

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all the costs that their insolvency cre- ates for the agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle trans- actions....

Catarina Goulão

vol. 162, n° 1, 2015, p. 135–157

We look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance (PuHI) to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and income, and the market is affected by adverse selection. We argue that making PuHI voluntary does not lead to its...

Stéphane Caprice et Patrick Rey

vol. 125, n° 589, décembre 2015, p. 1677–1704

We show that collective bargaining can enhance retailers’ buying power vis-àvis their suppliers. We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream leader faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates secretly with several firms that compete in a...

Andrew Atkeson, Christian Hellwig et Guillermo Ordonez

vol. 130, n° 1, 2015, p. 415–464

In all markets, firms go through a process of creative destruction: entry, random growth and exit. In many of these markets there are also regulations that restrict entry, possibly distorting this process. We study the public interest rationale for entry taxes in a general equilibrium model with...

Michel Cavagnac et Guillaume Cheikbossian

vol. 171, n° 2, 2015, p. 330–354

We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast...

Alec Zuo, Céline Nauges et Sarah Ann Wheeler

vol. 42, n° 1, 2015, p. 1–24

In this article, the role of water markets in helping farmers manage the risk of water shortage is studied. Using farm survey data from Australia's southern Murray–Darling Basin, one of the most active water markets in the world, we tested the relationship between farmers' exposure to risk and...

Pierre Dubois, Olivier de Mouzon, Fiona Scott Morton et Paul Seabright

vol. 46, n° 4, Winter 2015, p. 844–871

This paper quantifies the relationship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry using improved, and newer, methods and data. We find positive significant elasticities of innovation to expected market size with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 0.23. This...

Jean Tirole

vol. 105, n° 8, 2015, p. 2333–2363

When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers, be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market financing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability....

Fabien Gensbittel

vol. 40, n° 1, 2015, p. 80–104