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Céline Bonnet et Vincent Réquillart
n° 970, 2015
Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian et Asuman Ozdaglar
2015
With the increasing ease with which information can be shared in social media, the issue of privacy has become central for the functioning of various online platforms. In this paper, we consider how privacy concerns affect individual choices in the context of a network formation game (where links...
Susan Athey et Guido W. Imbens
décembre 2015
In this paper we propose methods for estimating heterogeneity in causal effects in experimental and observational studies, and for conducting hypothesis tests about the magnitude of the differences in treatment effects across subsets of the population. We provide a datadriven approach to partition...
Lily H. Fang, Josh Lerner et Chaopeng Wu
We study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection and ownership type affect innovation singly and jointly in China. We find that stronger local IPR protection is positively related to firms’ R&D investments and innovation. Private sector firms invest more in R&D and innovate more...
Emmanuelle Auriol et Sara Biancini
vol. 29, n° 1, 2015, p. 1–40
Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that, subsequent to integration, welfare decreases in both...
Guillaume Cheikbossian
vol. 125, n° 1, 2015, p. 145–169
Dans cet article, nous étudions l'aptitude des membres d'un groupe à coopérer dans leurs activités de recherche de rentes afin de renforcer leurs position dans le conflit qui les opposent à une institution en place pour l'attribution d'une rente. Plus précisément, nous considérons un jeu répété...
Andrew Rhodes
vol. 82, 2015, p. 360–390
We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it...
Catarina Goulão et Luca Panaccione
vol. 35, n° 1, 2015
In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 6 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can in uence the likelihood of states of 7 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 8 in a pool of promises of deliveries of...
Marion Desquilbet et Sylvette Monier-Dilhan
vol. 42, 2015, p. 129–150
Jay Pil Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon et Byung-Cheol KIM
vol. 7, n° 3, 2015, p. 103–141
