Jump to navigation
Adrien Blanchet (TSE) et Jean Clobert (SEEM)
Toulouse : IAST, 11 mai 2012, 14h00–15h30, salle MC202
Etienne Chevalier (Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 mai 2012, 13h45–15h00, salle MF 323
This paper concerns with the problem of determining an optimal control on the dividend and investment policy of a firm. We allow the company to make an investment by increasing its outstanding indebtedness, which would impact its capital structure and risk profile, thus resulting in higher interest...
Toulouse, France, 11–12 mai 2012
Patrick Bolton (IAST)
Toulouse : IAST, 10 mai 2012, 15h30–17h00, salle MF323
TBA
Mathias Thoening (HEC Lausanne)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 mai 2012, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other...
Morten Ravn (University College London)
Toulouse : TSE, 7 mai 2012, 17h00–18h30, salle AMPHI S
In the basic New Keynesian model in which the monetary authority operates a Taylor rule, multiple rational expectations equilibria arise, some of which display all the features of a liquidity trap. We show that a loss in confidence can set the economy on a deflationary path that eventually prevents...
Danny Campbell (Queen’s University Belfast)
Toulouse : TSE, 7 mai 2012, 11h00–12h30, salle AMPHI S
In this paper we utilise paradata relating to the response latency as a measure of the cognitive effort invested by respondents in self-administered online stated preference surveys. While the effects of response latency have been previously explored, this paper proposes a different approach....
Roberta Dessi (TSE) et Tomas Revilla (SEEM)
Toulouse : IAST, 4 mai 2012, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
Paris, 4 mai 2012
Anton Suvorov (CEFIR and New Economic School)
Toulouse : TSE, 3 mai 2012, 15h30–17h00, salle MF 323
Both psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs. One possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to offer higher rewards when she knows the task to be difficult. Our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is perceived by...
