Jump to navigation
Roberta Dessi, Edoardo Gallo et Sanjeev Goyal
vol. 163, mars 2016, p. 78–96
We study individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship networks using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In the experiment subjects are shown a network, in which their location is exogenously assigned, and they are then asked questions about the network...
Grégory Jolivet, Bruno Jullien et Fabien Postel-Vinay
vol. 45, mars 2016, p. 59–75
The broad aim of this paper is to gain some insight into the quantitative importance of reputation in e-commerce. We use an exhaustive data set from one of France’s largest e-commerce platforms, <a href="http://www.priceminister.com/">PriceMinister.com </a>, to estimate a statistical...
Alice Mesnard et Paul Seabright
vol. 82, n° 1, mars 2016, p. 1–26
This paper models how migration both influences and responds to differences in disease prevalence between cities and shows how the possibility of migration away from high-prevalence areas affects long-run steady state disease prevalence. We develop a dynamic framework where migration responds to...
Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Felicia C. Madimenos et Jonathan Stieglitz
vol. 31, n° 3, mars 2016, p. 663–671
Renato Gomes, Daniel Gottlieb et Lucas Maestri
vol. 96, mars 2016, p. 145–169
Firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well-known business models and the exploration of risky, untested approaches. In this paper, we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm with private information about its returns from exploration and exploitation....
Fabien Gensbittel
vol. 45, n° 1, mars 2016, p. 321–352
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player observes the realization of a Markov process (X, Y) on which the...
Johannes Hörner et Larry Samuelson
vol. 45, n° 1, mars 2016, p. 89–136
We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the...
Mike Hoy et Nicolas Treich
vol. 41, n° 1, mars 2016
23 mars 2016
Bruno Biais
