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Georgy Lukyanov, Konstantin Shamruk et Ekaterina Logina
n° 25-1680, octobre 2025
We study a dynamic reputation model with a fixed posted price where only pur-chases are public. A long-lived seller chooses costly quality; each buyer observes the purchase history and a private signal. Under a Markov selection, beliefs split into two cascades—where actions are unresponsive and...
Vasilii Ivanik et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1679, octobre 2025
We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors’ actions, decides whether to acquire a private signal (and how precise it should be), and then chooses between two actions. Payoffs value...
Bence Bago, Philippe Muller et Jean-François Bonnefon
n° 25-1678, octobre 2025
octobre 2025
Climate scepticism remains an important barrier to public engagement with accurate climate information, because sceptics often actively avoid information that contains climate science facts. There still lacks a scalable, repeatable intervention to boost sceptics’ engagement with climate information...
Georgy Lukyanov et Anna Vlasova
n° 25-1677, octobre 2025
We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive, belief-based equilibrium and show that advice is a reputation-...
Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1676, octobre 2025
Firms often choose between concentrated, renegotiable bank claims and dispersed, arm’s-length market debt. I develop a tractable adverse-selection model in which both financiers can take collateral, but they differ in enforcement and coordination efficiency at default. The single primitive wedge—a...
Mark Izgarshev et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1675, octobre 2025
A benevolent advisor observes a project’s complexity and posts a pass–fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project suc-ceeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We com-pare two informational regimes. In the naive regime, the threshold is treated as non-informative;...
Pierre Dubois
n° 25-1674, octobre 2025, révision décembre 2025
We examine pharmaceutical regulations and incentives for innovation from an international perspective, highlighting the public good nature of healthcare innovation and its cross-border diffusion. We summarize the empirical evidence on how push and pull incentives shape R&D investment,...
Patrick Fève et Alban Moura
n° 25-1673, octobre 2025
We propose to measure business cycles using vector autoregressions (VARs). Our method builds on two insights: VARs automatically decompose the data into stable and unstable components, and variance-based shock identfication can extract meaningful cycles from the stable part. This method has...
Shota Ichihashi et Alex Smolin
n° 25-1672, octobre 2025
In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recom-mendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer and its price. We characterize an algorithm that maximizes...
