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Romain Espinosa, Sylvie Borau et Nicolas Treich
vol. 14, n° 20584, septembre 2024
Anna D’Annunzio et Antonio Russo
n° 24-1569, septembre 2024
We study transaction fees applied by marketplace platforms where sellers (e.g., app developers) adopt freemium pricing. An ad valorem transaction fee reduces quality distortions introduced by the price-discriminating seller, thereby increasing consumer surplus. Moreover, a small fee increases...
Matthieu Bouvard et Catherine Casamatta
n° 24-1568, septembre 2024
We study agents that provide Cash-In/Cash-Out (CICO) services to mobile money consumers. A moral hazard friction constrains these agents’ ability to hold liquid reserves, which creates an endogenous cost for operators of ensuring reliable CICO services. Interoperability that allows agents to...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Patrick Rey
n° 24-1566, septembre 2024
We study the development of apps on competing platforms. We show that competition leads to commissions exceeding those maximizing consumer surplus (and, a fortiori, social welfare) whenever raising one commission reduces rivals' app bases. We relate this nding to economies of scope in app...
David Martimort et Jérôme Pouyet
n° 24-1564, septembre 2024, révision janvier 2025
A retailer may boost demand for a manufacturer’s product through unobservable promotional efforts. Fixed fees cannot be used to freely allocate profit within the vertical structure. When manufacturers have market power, the equilibrium wholesale contract features a retail price below cost together...
Fabien Gensbittel, Dana Pizarro et Jérôme Renault
vol. 14, n° 4, septembre 2024, p. 806 – 845
We extend the prophet inequality problem to a competitive setting. At every period, a new realization of a random variable with a known distribution arrives, which is publicly observed. Then two players simultaneously decide whether to pick an available value or to pass and wait until the next...
Ilaria Natali
n° 24-1563, septembre 2024
This paper empirically assesses the impact of laws restricting access to opioid painkillers and shows how local economic conditions matter for the magnitude of responses to these policies. By using a di˙erence in di˙erences (DiD) approach, I first estimate the causal impact of a new regulation that...
Marc Arnaudon, Koléhè Coulibaly-Pasquier et Laurent Miclo
vol. 37, septembre 2024
Daniel L. Chen
vol. 111, n° 102218, août 2024
Jean-Charles Rochet
vol. 113, août 2024, p. 103010
This expository article surveys the literature that has followed my paper “A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Rationalizability in a Quasi-linear Context” that was published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics in 1987.
