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Alexander Wolitzky (University of Stanford)
Toulouse : TSE, 12 mars 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle Amphi S
A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any...
Frank Verboven (University of Leuven)
TSE, 11 mars 2013, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
We analyze a large merger in the Swedish market for analgesics (painkillers). We confront the predictions from a merger simulation study, initiated during the investigation, with the actual merger effects over a two-year comparison window. The merger simulation model predicted a large price...
Hans Degryse (University of Tilburg)
TSE, 11 mars 2013, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
Theory shows that the non-exclusivity of financial contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect credit availability. Using internal information on a creditor’s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor...
Chuck Mason (University of Wyoming)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 mars 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
For decades resource economists have relied on the seminal Hotelling paper to model extraction and price paths, despite overwhelming evidence of the empirical limitations of the approach. Particularly in oil markets, the shortcomings of the Hotelling approach are evident: for over 100 years real...
Andres Santos (University of California -San Diego)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 mars 2013, 15h30–17h00, salle Amphi S
This paper examines the efficient estimation of partially identified models defined by moment inequalities that are convex in the parameter of interest. In such a setting, the identified set is itself convex and hence fully characterized by its support function. We provide conditions under which,...
Tommy Andersson (University of Lund)
Toulouse : TSE, 1 mars 2013, 13h45–15h00, salle MF 323
In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by the government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, a weaker equilibrium concept is suggested. Given...
Harry Di Pei (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 28 février 2013, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
I develop a theory of communication in which experts need to gather information at a cost before giving advice to decision makers. In contrast with the canonical sender-receiver game in which the sender's information is exogenous and costless, I show that first, the sender always communicates all...
Theocharis Grigoriadis (UC Berkeley)
Toulouse : IAST, 21 février 2013, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
Laura Ralston (MIT)
Toulouse : IAST, 20 février 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
Annamaria Milazzo (Bocconi University)
Toulouse : IAST, 14 février 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
