Recherche avancée

Andrew Rhodes

vol. 82, 2015, p. 360–390

We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it...

Catarina Goulão et Luca Panaccione

vol. 35, n° 1, 2015

In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 6 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can in uence the likelihood of states of 7 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 8 in a pool of promises of deliveries of...

Marion Desquilbet et Sylvette Monier-Dilhan

vol. 42, 2015, p. 129–150

Jay Pil Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon et Byung-Cheol KIM

vol. 7, n° 3, 2015, p. 103–141

Bruno Biais, Jean-Charles Rochet et Paul Woolley

vol. 28, n° 5, 2015, p. 1353–1380

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-–prevention export to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, confidence improves. This...

Guillaume Plantin

vol. 28, n° 1, 2015, p. 146–175

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all the costs that their insolvency cre- ates for the agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle trans- actions....

Catarina Goulão

vol. 162, n° 1, 2015, p. 135–157

We look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance (PuHI) to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and income, and the market is affected by adverse selection. We argue that making PuHI voluntary does not lead to its...

Stéphane Caprice et Patrick Rey

vol. 125, n° 589, décembre 2015, p. 1677–1704

We show that collective bargaining can enhance retailers’ buying power vis-àvis their suppliers. We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream leader faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates secretly with several firms that compete in a...

Andrew Atkeson, Christian Hellwig et Guillermo Ordonez

vol. 130, n° 1, 2015, p. 415–464

In all markets, firms go through a process of creative destruction: entry, random growth and exit. In many of these markets there are also regulations that restrict entry, possibly distorting this process. We study the public interest rationale for entry taxes in a general equilibrium model with...

Michel Cavagnac et Guillaume Cheikbossian

vol. 171, n° 2, 2015, p. 330–354

We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast...