Recherche avancée

Emmanuelle Auriol, Thomas Flochel et Stéphane Straub

vol. 77, janvier 2016, p. 395–407

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Emmanuelle Auriol, Guido Friebel et Frauke von Bieberstein

vol. 121, janvier 2016, p. 41–59

Thai Ha-Huy, Cuong Le Van et Manh-Hung Nguyen

vol. 79, janvier 2016, p. 30–39

Christophe Bontemps et Céline Nauges

vol. 98, n° 1, janvier 2016, p. 297–313

Céline Nauges et Maria Belen Zapata Diomedi

vol. 60, n° 1, janvier 2016, p. 112–129

Aurélie Ouss et Arnaud Philippe

n° 22, janvier 2016

Marie-Laure Allain, Patrick Rey et Claire Chambolle

vol. 83, n° 1, janvier 2016, p. 1–25

While vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold-up problem, this paper highlights instead that it can generate hold-up problems — for rivals. We first consider a successive duopoly where competition among suppliers eliminates any risk of hold-up; downstreamfirms thus...

Henrik Andersson, Arne Risa Hole et Mikael Svensson

vol. 75, janvier 2016, p. 41–53

This study elicits individual risk preferences in the context of an infectious disease using choice experiments. A main objective is to examine scope sensitivity using a novel approach. Our results suggest that the value of a mortality risk reduction (VSL) is highly sensitive to the survey design....

K.J. Martijn Cremers et Simone M. Sepe

vol. 68, n° 1, janvier 2016, p. 67–148

Stéphane Bonhomme, Koen Jochmans et Jean-Marc Robin

vol. 78, janvier 2016, p. 211–229