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Daniel L. Chen et Martin Schonger
n° 16-703, septembre 2016, révision février 2020
Ambiguity aversion has been used to explain a wide range of phenomena in law and policy: incomplete contracts, stock market volatility, abstention from voting, and why prosecutors offer and defendants accept harsh plea bargains. This paper presents evidence problematizing the experimental basis for...
Carlos Berdejo et Daniel L. Chen
n° 16-704, septembre 2016
We find field evidence for what experimental studies have documented regarding the contexts and characteristics that make individuals more susceptible to priming. Just before U.S. Presidential elections, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along...
Daniel L. Chen et Susan Yeh
n° 16-705, septembre 2016
Does law shape values? We test a model of law and norms using an area of law where economic incentives are arguably not the prime drivers of social change. From 1958–2008, Democratic judges were more likely than Republicans to favor progressive free speech standards. Using the random assignment of...
Daniel L. Chen
n° 16-706, septembre 2016, révision février 2020
During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12% of them; the others received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case...
n° 16-707, septembre 2016, révision février 2017
I detect intra-judge variation in judicial decisions driven by factors completely unrelated 5 to the merits of the case, or to any case characteristic for that matter. Concretely, I show that asylum 6 grant rates in U.S. immigration courts differ by the success of the court city’s NFL team on the...
Daniel F. Garrett
septembre 2016
This paper studies the design of e¢ cient mechanisms for repeated trade in settings where (i) tradersvalues and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping...
Angel Lopez et Patrick Rey
vol. 64, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 436–465
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way...
Pierre Dubois et Tomislav Vukina
vol. 16, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 1239–1272
We study the effects of the change in contract length on the agents’ incentives to invest and exert effort. We present an agent’s dynamic decision model that explicitly deals with two types of investments and directly allows for contract regime switching by varying the probability of contract...
Mohamed Saleh
vol. 76, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 697–735
Ragui Assaad et Mohamed Saleh
This paper examines the effect of increased local supply of schooling on intergenerational mobility in education in Jordan. We use a unique data set that links individual data on own schooling and parents’ schooling for adults, from a household survey, with the annual supply of schools in the sub-...
