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Daniel L. Chen, Jens Frankenreiter et Susan Yeh
n° 16-715, octobre 2016
Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents, such as judges, to follow the law. Are judges motivated only by strategic interests and ideology, as many models posit, rather than a duty to follow the law? We use the random assignment of U.S. Federal judges setting geographically-...
Daniel L. Chen, Vardges Levonyan, S.Eric Reinhart et Glen Taksler
n° 16-716, octobre 2016
We present and test a model of mandatory disclosure. The effects of disclosure laws on what is being disclosed are typically unknown since data on disclosed activity rarely exist in the absence of disclosure laws. We exploit data from legal settlements disclosing $316 million in pharmaceutical...
Daniel L. Chen et Martin Schonger
n° 16-717, octobre 2016
The study of the normative and positive theory of choice under uncertainty has made major advances through thought experiments often referred to as paradoxes: the St. Petersburg paradox, the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, and the Rabin paradox. Machina proposes a new thought experiment which...
Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller et Bilel Rahali
n° 16-718, octobre 2016
We investigate how people trade off between equity and efficiency, using variations of tripled dictator and trust games in a lab experiment. Equalizing payoffs reduces the return from the tripled investment in the dictator game. In contrast, in the trust game both equal and maximized payoffs can be...
David Bardey, Jorge Tovar et Nicolas Santos
n° 16-719, octobre 2016
In this paper we estimate the degree of substitutability for advertisers across different media outlets. The estimates are motivated by the need that competition agencies have to properly characterize the relevant market when dealing with mergers in the media industry. As technology changes the...
David Bardey et Daniel Mejía
n° 16-720, octobre 2016
This article tackles the feature of optimal public policy such as the level of enforcement and the supply of public goods in an economy characterized by a huge informal sector. We consider informality as the group of productive activities which,before hand, do not comply (totally or partially) with...
Daniel L. Chen et Eric Reinhart
n° 16-721, octobre 2016, révision février 2017
Principles of apoliticality and personal disinterestedness subtend the American judiciary’s claims to legitimacy and the liberal constitutional legal system it upholds. Less than 1% of U.S. Federal judges report political motivations for retirement and resignation. Our data suggest political...
Daniel L. Chen et Jo Thori Lind
n° 16-722, octobre 2016
Why are religious groups with greater within-group charitable giving more socially conservative and opposed to the welfare state? We propose and test a theory where religious provision of social insurance explains why fiscal and social conservatism align. The alignment disappears when there is a...
Daniel L. Chen, Vardges Levonyan et Susan Yeh
n° 16-723, octobre 2016
Whether policies shift preferences is relevant to policy design. We exploit the random assignment of U.S. federal judges creating geographically local precedent and the fact that judges’ politics, religion, and race predict decision-making in abortion jurisprudence. Instrumenting for abortion...
n° 16-724, octobre 2016, révision février 2020
Most papers that employ the strategy method (SM) use many observations per subject to study responses to rare or off-equilibrium behavior that cannot be observed using direct elicitation (DE), but ignore that the strategic equivalence between SM and DE holds for the monetary payoff game but not the...
