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Baptiste Massenot et Stéphane Straub
vol. 54, n° 2, avril 2016, p. 1046–1067
A standard view holds that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement would reduce informality and boost investment and growth. We show, however, that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a concentrated bank- ing sector or with low financial openness. When the formal...
Roberta Dessi et Salvatore Piccolo
vol. 83, avril 2016, p. 90–110
We develop a theory of the emergence of merchant guilds as an efficient mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, building on the complementarity between merchant guilds’ ability to enforce monopoly over trade and their social capital. Unlike existing models, we focus on local...
C. Liquete, N. Cid, Denis Lanzanova, Bruna Grizzetti et Arnaud Reynaud
vol. 63, avril 2016, p. 249–257
The relationship between biodiversity and each ecosystem service or bundle of ecosystem services (e.g. win−win, win−lose or win−neutral) is an active field of research that requires structured and consistent information. The application of that research for conservation and decision-making can be...
Fany Declerck
n° 20, avril 2016, p. 153–160
Chiara Canta, Pierre Pestieau et Emmanuel Thibault
vol. 61, n° 4, avril 2016, p. 755–785
The rising level of long-term care (LTC) expenditures and their financing sources are likely to impact savings and capital accumulation and henceforth the pattern of growth. This paper studies how the joint interaction of the family, the market and the State influences capital accumulation in a...
Adrien Blanchet et Pierre Degond
vol. 163, n° 1, avril 2016, p. 41–60
We consider a finite number of particles characterised by their positions and velocities. At random times a randomly chosen particle, the follower, adopts the velocity of another particle, the leader. The follower chooses its leader according to the proximity rank of the latter with respect to the...
Christian Gollier
vol. 30, avril 2016
Philippe De Donder et John E. Roemer
vol. 18, « 1 », avril 2016, p. 85–96
We study how rich shareholders use their political influence to deregulate firms that they own, thus skewing the income distribution towards themselves. Individuals differ in productivity and choose how much labor to supply. High productivity individuals also own shares in the productive sector and...
Arnaud Reynaud
vol. 74, avril 2016, p. 65–78
Xiaoxi Li, Marc Quincampoix et Jérôme Renault
vol. 36, n° 4, avril 2016, p. 2113–2132
We consider optimal control problems where the running cost of the trajectory is evaluated by a probability measure on R. As a particular case, we take the Cesàro average of the running cost over a fixed horizon. The limit of the value with Cesàro average when the horizon tends to infinity is...