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Vera Zaporozhets
n° 16-673, juillet 2016
We study a simple in?uence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We also show the...
Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz et Kelly Shue
n° 16-674, juillet 2016
Daniel L. Chen et John J. Horton
n° 16-675, juillet 2016
In some online labor markets, workers are paid by the task, choose what tasks to work on, and have little or no interaction with their (usually anonymous) buyer/employer. These markets look like true spot markets for tasks rather than markets for employment. Despite appearances, we find via a field...
Elie Gray et André Grimaud
n° 16-676, juillet 2016
This paper analyzes the link between the fact that fully endogenous growth models exhibit (or not) the non-desirable scale effects property and assumptions regarding the intensity of knowledge diffusion. In that respect, we extend a standard Schumpeterian growth model by introducing explicitly...
Fuhito Kojima et Takuro Yamashita
n° 16-677, juillet 2016
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism which satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this...
Daniel F. Garrett
n° 16-679, juillet 2016
We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate...
Jeffrey Ely, Daniel F. Garrett et Toomas Hinnosaar
n° 16-678, juillet 2016
We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking...
Daniel L. Chen, Yosh Halberstam et Alan Yu
n° 16-680, juillet 2016, révision février 2020
The emphasis on “fit” as a hiring criterion has raised the spectrum of a new form of subtle discrimination (Yoshino 1998; Bertrand and Duflo 2016). Under complete markets, correlations between employee characteristics and outcomes persist only if there exists animus for the marginal employer (...
Daniel L. Chen
n° 16-681, juillet 2016, révision août 2016
U.S. Presidential elections polarize U.S. Courts of Appeals judges, doubling their dissents, partisan voting, and lawmaking along partisan lines and increasing their reversal of District Court decisions (Berdejo and Chen 2016). Dissents are elevated for ten months before the Presidential elections...
n° 16-682, juillet 2016
Previous studies suggest a significant role of language in the court room, yet none has identified a definitive correlation between vocal characteristics and court outcomes. This paper demonstrates that voice-based snap judgments based solely on the introductory sentences of lawyers arguing in...
