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Daniel F. Garrett
septembre 2016
This paper studies the design of e¢ cient mechanisms for repeated trade in settings where (i) tradersvalues and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping...
Angel Lopez et Patrick Rey
vol. 64, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 436–465
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way...
Pierre Dubois et Tomislav Vukina
vol. 16, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 1239–1272
We study the effects of the change in contract length on the agents’ incentives to invest and exert effort. We present an agent’s dynamic decision model that explicitly deals with two types of investments and directly allows for contract regime switching by varying the probability of contract...
Mohamed Saleh
vol. 76, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 697–735
Ragui Assaad et Mohamed Saleh
This paper examines the effect of increased local supply of schooling on intergenerational mobility in education in Jordan. We use a unique data set that links individual data on own schooling and parents’ schooling for adults, from a household survey, with the annual supply of schools in the sub-...
Renato Gomes et Alessandro Pavan
vol. 11, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 1005–1052
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and...
James K. Hammitt, Lisa A. Robinson et Richard Zeckhauser
vol. 10, n° 2, septembre 2016, p. 308–328
Before promulgating a major environmental, health, or safety regulation, U.S. government agencies are generally expected to analyze the distribution of its impacts as well as its total costs and benefits. We review several regulatory analyses to determine whether this expectation is being met. We...
Paul Seabright
vol. 175, septembre 2016, p. 201–219
Johannes Hörner et Satoru Takahashi
vol. 165, septembre 2016, p. 332–359
Hélène Boistard, Guillaume Chauvet et David Haziza
vol. 43, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 683–699
Item non-response in surveys occurs when some, but not all, variables are missing. Unadjusted estimators tend to exhibit some bias, called the non-response bias, if the respondents differ from the non-respondents with respect to the study variables. In this paper, we focus on item non-response,...