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Koen Jochmans
vol. 99, juillet 2017, p. 478–485
Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon et Jean-Paul Décamps
n° 17-821, juin 2017
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if...
Philippe De Donder, Frank Rodriguez et Soterios Soteri
n° 17-822, juin 2017
Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder
n° 17-823, juin 2017
Daughters are the principal caregivers of their dependent parents. In this paper, we study long-term care (LTC) choices by bargaining families with mixed- or same-gender siblings. LTC care can be provided either informally by children, or formally at home or in an institution. A social norm implies...
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret
n° 17-824, juin 2017
Applied researchers often combine Difference In Differences (DID) with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes when the Parallel Trend Assumption (PTA) fails. I examine both the theoretical and empirical basis for this approach. I show that the theoretical argument that both methods combine their...
Joanna Morais et Thi-Huong Trinh
n° 17-825, juin 2017
This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of socioeconomic factors, like food expenditure level and urbanization, on diet patterns in Vietnam, from 2004 to 2014. Contrary to the existing literature, we focus on the diet balance in terms of macronutrients consumption (protein, fat and...
Bruno Biais, Fany Declerck et Sophie Moinas
n° 17-818, juin 2017
Who provides liquidity in modern, electronic limit order book, markets? While agency trading can be constrained by conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between customers and traders, prop traders are likely to be less constrained and thus better positioned to carry inventory risk....
Bruno Biais, Florian Heider et Marie Hoerova
n° 17-819, juin 2017
We study the interaction between contracting and equilibrium pricing when risk- averse hedgers purchase insurance from risk-neutral investors subject to moral hazard. Moral hazard limits risk-sharing. In the individually optimal contract, margins are called (after bad news) to improve risk-sharing...
Patrick Rey et David Salant
n° 17-820, juin 2017, révision juin 2019
Regulators must often allocate essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, which can transform the structure of the downstream market. These decisions involve a trade-off, as provisions aimed at fostering competition and lowering prices for consumers,...
Daniel F. Garrett
n° 17-830, juin 2017
We study the optimal mechanism in a dynamic sales relationship where the buyerís arrival date is uncertain, and where his value changes stochastically over time. The buyerís arrival date is the Örst date at which contracting is feasible and is his private information. To induce immediate...
