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Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder
n° 17-858, novembre 2017
The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they...
Fabien Gensbittel et Christine Grün
n° 17-859, novembre 2017
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that the players have access to stopping times with respect to...
Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Roberta Dessi, Frédéric Moisan et Donald Robertson
n° 17-860, novembre 2017, révision décembre 2023
Individuals’ decisions to behave prosocially (or the contrary) can often be observed by other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may nevertheless be influenced by them (e.g. through social media). Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably younger,...
Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley et Olivier de Mouzon
n° 17-861, novembre 2017, révision mai 2018
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate Compact which are considered here differ in...
Milo Bianchi et Jean-Marc Tallon
n° 17-862, novembre 2017
We match administrative panel data on portfolio choices with survey data on preferences over ambiguity. We show that ambiguity averse investors bear more risk, due to a lack of diversiÖcation. In particular, they exhibit a form of home bias that leads to higher exposure to the domestic relative to...
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni et Gwenaël Piaser
n° 17-863, novembre 2017
We study competing mechanism games in which principals simultaneously design contracts to deal with several agents. We show that principals can profit from privately communicating with agents by generating incomplete information in the continuation game they play. Specifically, we construct an...
Anne Boring et Arnaud Philippe
n° 17-865, novembre 2017
We conduct a field experiment to assess the impact of two different interventions designed to reduce gender biases in student evaluations of teaching (SET). In the first intervention, students received a normative statement by email, essentially reminding them that they should not discriminate in...
Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, Jianyu Yu et Angelo Zago
n° 17-866, novembre 2017
Collective labels are widespread in food markets, either separated or nested with private brands; the latter known as nested names. We propose a model to explain the rationale of nested names, with collective labels being effective in reaching unaware consumers while individual brands help firms to...
Matteo Bobba, Luca Flabbi et Santiago Levy
n° 17-867, novembre 2017, révision juin 2021
We develop a search and matching model where firms and workers are allowed to form matches (jobs) that can be formal or informal. Workers choose the level of schooling acquired before entering the labor market and whether searching for a job as unemployed or as self-employed. Firms post vacancies...
K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov et Simone M. Sepe
vol. 126, n° 2, novembre 2017, p. 422–444
