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Ryan Chahrour et Robert Ulbricht
n° 17-784, mars 2017, révision décembre 2017
We develop a methodology to characterize equilibrium in DSGE models, free of parametric restrictions on information. First, we define a “primal” economy in which deviations from full information are captured by wedges in agents' expectations. Then, we provide conditions ensuring some information-...
Adrien Blanchet, Guillaume Carlier et Luca Nenna
n° 17-785, mars 2017
We consider a class of games with continuum of players where equilibria can be obtained by the minimization of a certain functional related to optimal transport as emphasized in [7]. We then use the powerful entropic regularization technique to approximate the problem and solve it numerically in...
Adrien Blanchet et Pierre Degond
n° 17-786, mars 2017
We consider systems of agents interacting through topological interactions. These have been shown to play an important part in animal and human behavior. Precisely, the system consists of a finite number of particles characterized by their positions and velocities. At random times a randomly chosen...
Adrien Blanchet et Jérôme Bolte
n° 17-787, mars 2017
For displacement convex functionals in the probability space equipped with the Monge-Kantorovich metric we prove the equivalence between the gradient and functional type Lojasiewicz inequalities. In a second part, we specialise these inequalities to some classical geodesically convex functionals....
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié
n° 17-788, mars 2017, révision janvier 2021
This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market...
Michel Le Breton et Karine Van Der Straeten
n° 17-789, mars 2017, révision juin 2017
L’objet de cet article est d’offrir une présentation synthétique des principaux travaux théoriques et empiriques portant sur la formation des coalitions électorales et gouvernementales et utilisant comme socle méthodologique la théorie des jeux coopératifs avec ou sans utilité transférable.
Johannes Hörner et Stefano Lovo
n° 17-790, mars 2017
We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for trading with potentially informed retail traders. For a class of market microstructure models, we characterize equilibria in which dealers’ dynamic pricing strategies are optimal no matter...
Alessandro Bonatti et Johannes Hörner
n° 17-791, mars 2017
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium....
Johannes Hörner et Satoru Takahashi
n° 17-792, mars 2017
n° 17-793, mars 2017
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts,...
