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Fabrice Collard, Harris Dellas et G. Tavlas
vol. 84, n° 336, 2017, p. 797–819
Laurent Miclo
vol. 22, 2017, p. 1–38
Shui Feng, Laurent Miclo et Feng-Yu Wang
vol. 14, n° 1, 2017, p. 361–380
vol. 26, n° 6, 2017, p. 417–435
vol. 53, n° 2, 2017, p. 957–996
Daniel Bump, Persi Diaconis, Angela Hicks, Laurent Miclo et Harold Widom
vol. 26, n° 6, 2017, p. 263–288
Tiziana Assenza, A. Brock et C.H. Hommes
Western Economic Association International, vol. 55, n° 1, 2017, p. 542–564
We introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans, where households lend to firms based on heterogeneous expectations about their loan default probability. Agents select endogenously among heterogeneous expectation rules, based upon their relative performance. Due to strong...
Philippe De Donder et Francisco Martinez-Mora
vol. 154, 2017, p. 1–9
We build a political economy model allowing us to shed light on the empirically observed simultaneous increase in university size and participation gap. Parents differ in income and in the ability of their unique child. They vote over the minimum ability level required to attend public universities...
Hunt Allcott et Matthew Gentzkow
vol. 31, n° 2, 2017, p. 211–236
Following the 2016 US presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories ("fake news"), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data,...
Alexandre de Cornière et Rodrigo Montes
vol. 16, n° 3, 2017, p. 291–305
This paper studies how product customization and consumer privacy affect a monopolist’s incentives to engage in perfect price discrimination. We consider a monopolist that faces an ex ante choice to commit to price discrimination or to a uniform price. We introduce a simple model in which a...