Recherche avancée

Marcel Boyer

Monographie CIRANO Monograph, 2017, 601 pages

James Dow, Itay Goldstein et Alexander Guembel

vol. 15, n° 4, 2017, p. 877–909

We analyze information production incentives for traders in financial markets, when firms condition investment decisions on information revealed through stock prices. We show that traders’ private value of information about a firm’s investment project increases with the ex ante likelihood the...

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Abdelaati Daouia, Léopold Simar et Paul Wilson

vol. 36, n° 1-3, 2017, p. 156–181

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Samuele Centorrino, Frédérique Fève et Jean-Pierre Florens

vol. 63, n° 1, 2017, p. 1–25

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Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder

vol. 30, 2017, p. 141–161

We show that once interfamily exchanges are considered, Becker?s rotten kids mechan- ism has some remarkable implications that have gone hitherto unnoticed. Specifically, we establish that Cornes and Silva's (1999) result of e¢fficiency in the contribution game amongst siblings extends to a setting...

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Audrey Desbonnet et Sumudu Kankanamge

vol. 1, n° 8, 2017, p. 1996–2032

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Fuhito Kojima et Takuro Yamashita

vol. 12, n° 3, 2017, p. 1393–1438

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism which satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this...

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Jeffrey Ely, Daniel F. Garrett et Toomas Hinnosaar

vol. 15, n° 6, décembre 2017, p. 1258–1301

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking...

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Philippe De Donder et Marie-Louise Leroux

vol. 49, n° 3-4, décembre 2017, p. 755–786

We develop a model where families consist of one parent and one child, with children differing in income and all agents having the same probability of becoming dependent when old. Young and old individuals vote over the size of a social long term care transfer program, which children complement...

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Céline Nauges et Dale Whittington

vol. 91, 2017, p. 125–143

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