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Takuro Yamashita
n° 18-937, juillet 2018
This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' values, where each bidder may have additional information (e.g., through information acquisition). Under certain conditions, we characterize the optimal mechanisms in terms of the expected revenue that...
Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu
n° 18-938, juillet 2018, révision janvier 2021
In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. This...
Shintaro Miura et Takuro Yamashita
n° 18-939, juillet 2018
We consider a cheap-talk game à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with almost-common interest players. The sender's bias parameter is only approximately common knowledge. Compared to the standard case where the structure of the bias parameter is (exactly) common knowledge, communication between the...
Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata et Takuro Yamashita
n° 18-940, juillet 2018
We study an auction that maximizes the expected social surplus under an upperbound constraint on the seller's expected revenue, which we call a revenue cap. Such a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when: (i) the auction designer is "pro-buyer", that is, he maximizes the weighted...
Takashi Kunimoto et Takuro Yamashita
n° 18-942, juillet 2018
Fumitoshi Moriya et Takuro Yamashita
n° 18-941, juillet 2018
In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they...
Christian Bontemps et Rohit Kumar
n° 18-943, juillet 2018, révision mars 2019
In this paper, we consider inference procedures for entry games with complete information. Due to the presence of multiple equilibria, we know that such a model may be set identified without imposing further restrictions. We complete the model with the unknown selection mechanism and characterize...
Claude Crampes et Jérôme Renault
n° 18-964, juillet 2018
The development of non-dispatchable renewable sources of energy requires more flexible reliable thermal equipment to match residual demand. We analyze the advantages of delaying production decisions to benefit from more precise information on states of the world, at the expense of higher production...
Michael Webb, Nick Short, Nicholas Bloom et Josh Lerner
n° 24793, juillet 2018
Patenting in software, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence has grown rapidly in recent years. Such patents are acquired primarily by large US technology firms such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, and HP, as well as by Japanese multinationals such as Sony, Canon, and Fujitsu. Chinese patenting...
Tim Lee et Ananth Seshadri
vol. 128, n° 612, juillet 2018, p. 114–151
We employ equality of opportunity (EOP) definitions that have appeared in the philosophical literature on distributive justice to a quantitative economic model that incorporates human capital investment and luck, within and across generations. The model is calibrated to the U.S. in 1990, and we...
