Jump to navigation
Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University)
Toulouse : TSE, 16 mars 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003
This paper uses a unique data set from the first regional schools in colonial Benin to document and measure intergenerational mobility and its effect on risk aversion, work ethics, mental health and life outlook. The study covers the first generation of students and their unschooled counterparts...
Manufacture des tabacs, Toulouse, France, 16–17 mars 2016
Ufuk Akcigit (University of Chicago)
TSE, 15 mars 2016, 17h00–18h30, salle MS 001
Firm dynamics in poor countries show striking differences to those of rich countries. While few firms indeed experience growth as they age, most firms are simply stagnant in that they neither exit nor expand. We interpret this fact as a lack of selection, whereby producers with little growth...
Brendan Beare (University of California, San Diego)
TSE, 15 mars 2016, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
Françoise Forges
Toulouse : TSE, 15 mars 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
We investigate to which extent the players of a one-shot Bayesian non-cooperative game can agree on a committed joint decision (namely, sign a “contract”) after having exchanged information through cheap talk. The main differences with previous approaches to contracts in Bayesian games (e.g.,...
Eric Mengus (HEC, Paris)
15 mars 2016
Myrto Kalouptsidi (Princeton University)
TSE, 14 mars 2016, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
Jean Noel Barrot (MIT Sloan School of Management)
TSE, 14 mars 2016, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
We study a fall in financing constraints for small businesses following the US Federal Quickpay reform of 2011 and estimate its effect on firm-level employment. The reform accelerated payments for a subset of small business contractors to the US government, leading to a large positive cash flow...
Leslie Martin (University of Melbourne)
Toulouse : TSE, 14 mars 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003
In a voluntary emissions-reductions system, regulators must evaluate and sign off on firms' claims of what they would have done absent credits. This paper uses the behavior of non-participants and rejected applicants to ex-post evaluate these claims. We focus on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)...
Yakov Babichenko (Technion, Israel Institute of Technology)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 mars 2016, 14h00–15h15, salle MS 003
We consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion problem where an in- formed sender tries to persuade a group of agents to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signalling policy where she sends a private signal to every agent. The payoff to the sender is a function of the...
