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Andrew Yates (University of North Carolina)
2024
David Martimort, Pierre Fleckinger et Nicolas Roux
vol. 62, n° 4, décembre 2024, p. 1589–1646
What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research suggests that, depending on the organizational context, the optimal approach to providing incentives may...
Helmuth Cremer et Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
n° 24-1527, 2024, révision juin 2024
We study the design of nonlinear reimbursement rules for expenses on secondary preventive and on therapeutic care. With some probability individuals are healthy and do not need any therapeutic health care. Otherwise they become ill and the severity of their disease is realized and identifies their...
Antonio Russo (Institut Mines Télécom Business School)
TSE, 2024
Agnès Gramain (Université de Lorraine), Pascal Plantard (Université Rennes 2), Martin Vanier (École d'Urbanisme de Paris) et Philippe Wahl (La Poste Groupe)
Jean-François Bonnefon (Toulouse School of Economics and CNRS)
Yanyou Chen (University of Toronto)
Linfeng Chen (Zhejiang Gongshang University Hangzhou College of Commerce)
José Anson (Universal Postal Union)
Adi Shany (Tel Aviv University)
