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Pierre Boyer (Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau)
TSE, 13 mai 2016, 11h00–12h15, salle MS 003
We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete for election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to implement an e fficient reform and choose the level of public debt. Politicians also allocate pork-barrel spending to...
Manufacture des Tabacs, Building S, Toulouse, France : TSE, 13–14 mai 2016, salle MS 001
John Hibbing (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
Toulouse : IAST, 12 mai 2016, 15h30–16h30, salle MS001
Christoph Wolf (University of Mannheim)
Toulouse : TSE, 12 mai 2016, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
I study the optimal contract offered by a principal funding a financially constrained agent to work on a multistage project. The project requires all stages to be completed to realize its benefits. Exerting effort in early stages of the project is informative but not conclusive about the prospects...
Pascaline Dupas (Stanford University)
Toulouse : TSE, 12 mai 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003
Many technologies require local experimentation before individuals can make successful adoption and usage decisions. Since information is a public good, technology adoption subsidies are an important component of development policy. We ask whether it is possible to enhance technology adoption...
Timo Ali-Vehmas (Nokia), Robin S'Tzing (Nokia) et Pekka Saaskilah (Nokia)
TSE & IAST, 11 mai 2016, 12h30–13h30, salle MS003
David Atkin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
TSE, 10 mai 2016, 17h00–18h30, salle MS 001
We conduct a randomized control trial that generates exogenous variation in the access to foreign markets for rug producers in Egypt. Combined with detailed survey data, we causally identify the impact of exporting on profits and productivity. Treatment firms report 16-26 percent higher profits and...
Tatiana Komarova (London School of Economics)
TSE, 10 mai 2016, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
Motivated by the empirical prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have preferences over combinations. In this model...
Srihari Govindan (University of Rochester)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 mai 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
Victoria Ivashina (Harvard Business School)
10 mai 2016
